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THE FORMAL STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
AND FREE SPEECH ANALYSIS
JOHN FEE*
The state action doctrine is fundamental to constitutional law. Its
primary value, however, is not as a threshold requirement, as it is
usually understood. The proper function of the state action
doctrine is analytical: it requires one to isolate the elements of state
action in a case from the elements of private action and focus the
constitutional questions on the former. State action exists in some
form in every case, but the relevant state action is often
constitutional. Proper use of the state action doctrine does not lead
to extreme results, but it does have a clarifying effect on substantive
constitutional rights.
A formal approach to state action is a prerequisite to resolving
constitutional problems in a principled way, such as the extent of
one's right to speak in public places. As applied to this problem, a
formal state action doctrine need not change the balance of power
between those who would engage in public expression and those
who would restrict it, but it would improve the way in which we
discuss and interpret the freedom of speech. Ultimately a formal
approach to state action would lead to a more consistent focus on
whether speakers have adequate means of communication, and
would not attach dispositive significance to the way in which
property rights are allocated.
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INTRODUCTION
According to conventional wisdom, society is divided into two
domains: one that is government-controlled and another that is
privately controlled. Depending on which domain one is in makes all
the difference in how one's constitutional rights are adjudicated.
Consider two examples:
A. A group of citizens are involved in a campaign to recall the
governor of their state and seek to collect signatures to place
the issue on the ballot. It is summertime in a hot desert climate,
so few pedestrians are on city sidewalks. The most feasible
place to solicit signatures is at a large indoor shopping mall,
where large numbers of people gather. Private mall
regulations, however, prohibit political speech on the premises.
The campaigners claim that they have a First Amendment right
to gather signatures at the mall.1
B. A city sells a parcel of land to a private organization for an
outdoor plaza, retaining an easement for public pedestrian
access, but expressly giving the organization the power to
control speech in the area. After the plaza is built, the
organization imposes rules restricting public speech. Some
1. Scenario A is based on Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Committee, 767 P.2d
719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), in which a private organization sought to put the question
whether Arizona Governor Evan Mecham should be recalled to a statewide election.
Phoenix area malls denied recallers access to their premises for the purpose of soliciting
signatures. The state court of appeals upheld the denial in the face of a constitutional
challenge, despite the argument that summer heat had forced pedestrians indoors. Id. at
724.
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citizens, who would like to protest against the organization,
argue that the First Amendment entitles them to use the public
easement to communicate their views.2
Current law handles these cases in dramatically different ways.
In case A, the speakers' First Amendment claim will fail simply
because there is no cognizable state action.' It does not matter
whether there are other feasible locations to gather signatures,4 nor
whether the mall serves in other respects as a public forum. It does
not matter if the mall regulations are objectively unreasonable or
discriminate on the basis of content.6 There is no balancing test. For
federal constitutional purposes, it is relevant only that the mall is
privately owned and that the owner (not the government) has chosen
to prohibit the speech in question.7 In example B, the demonstrators
have a much stronger case because the city has retained an easement
on the plaza, most likely satisfying the state action requirement. A
court will likely apply full First Amendment scrutiny, as if the area
2. Scenario B is based on First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d
1114 (10th Cir. 2002). Salt Lake City sold a block of Main Street to the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, retaining a pedestrian easement over the land. Although the
easement specified that it did not create a public forum, the Tenth Circuit found that the
area constituted a traditional public forum based on objective characteristics, and thereby
found the church's speech restrictions invalid. After the ruling, the city agreed to vacate
the public easement in exchange for further consideration, giving the church control over
both speech and access on the plaza. Heather May, LDS Plaza Deal Done, SALT LAKE
TRIB., July 29, 2003, at Al, available at http://global.factiva.com/eneserch/ss-hl.asp (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
3. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (rejecting free speech claim
against private mall); Fiesta Mall, 767 P.2d at 724 (same). Some states have interpreted
state constitutional provisions more expansively so as to protect public speech at large
shopping malls, see, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347-48 (Cal.
1979), but these states remain the exception. See Jennifer Niles Coffin, The United Mall of
America: Free Speech, State Constitutions, and the Growing Fortress of Private Property,
33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 615, 625-30 (2000) (collecting cases).
4. In Hudgens, for example, an agency found that there were no alternative means
for union members to communicate with the employees of a shopping mall except by
entering the mall premises, 424 U.S. at 511, but the Supreme Court did not even discuss
this concern when it rejected the speaker's First Amendment claim on state action
grounds. See id. at 512-21; see also Schad v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1217
(N.Y. 1985) (declaring that the judiciary is precluded from casting aside the state action
doctrine in an effort to achieve a socially desirable result).
5. Fiesta Mall, 767 P.2d at 724; Schad, 488 N.E.2d at 1217-18.
6. One court upheld a mall regulation prohibiting a customer from wearing an
offensive t-shirt that the customer purchased from a store in that mall, while at the same
time allowing the store to openly display the shirt. Lantz v. Franklin Park Mgmt. Corp.,
720 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 n.4 (Ohio Misc. 1999).
7. See, e.g., Lantz, 720 N.E.2d at 1021 (upholding mall regulation prohibiting t-shirt
with obscene message).
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were a government-owned plaza.8 Accordingly, if the location is like
a traditional sidewalk or park, only limited "time, place, and manner"
speech restrictions are constitutionally permissible.9 It would not
matter whether the city or the private organization intended to allow
public speech on the plaza.1" Nor would it suffice that there are other
nearby locations where speakers can communicate their views
adequately.1 In a traditional public forum, the First Amendment
requires a robust speech environment where even offensive and
moderately harmful speech must be allowed.
This dichotomy between public and private spheres affects many
areas of constitutional law. It also raises several puzzles. One
problem is how to define the boundary between public and private
spheres in a world of overlapping interests and roles. In this "golden
age of 'privatization,' "12 where private entities often perform public
functions with government-sanctioned authority, it is not easy to
identify where the government domain ends and the private domain
begins for purposes of constitutional law.
Even more problematic is the practice of making these
distinctions based on the allocation of property. Are not all property
rights a form of legally created authority? If some constitutional
rights exist only in places where the government has a property
interest, does this allow the government to control those rights by
redefining its property or by conveying its property to private parties?
Moreover, if the government has the greater power to eliminate
public rights by transferring its property to private entities, why can it
not exercise the lesser power of restricting those rights on property
that it retains?
8. Courts are somewhat divided on this point, but the weight of authority is towards
applying the public forum doctrine to places where the government holds an easement.
See First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1121-28 (10th Cir. 2002)
(finding a public forum on land where government holds a pedestrian easement);
Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d 937 (9th
Cir. 2001) (same); Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Animal Exploitation, Inc. v.
Faneuil Hall Marketplace, 745 F. Supp. 65 (D. Mass. 1990) (mem.) (same). But see S.O.C.,
Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, 23 P.3d 243 (Nev. 2001) (en banc) (finding that no public
forum exists on sidewalk where the government merely has an easement).
9. See First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1128.
10. See id. at 1124.
11. See Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("[T]he streets are
natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not
to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place.").
12. Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of
Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553, 553 (2002).
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The so-called state action doctrine-the principle that only
government actors are subject to constitutional rules-implicates
these problems and others. It is a doctrine whose relationship to
other substantive principles of constitutional law is rich and complex,
and yet is seldom discussed in judicial opinions or in academic
commentary. 3 Instead, the state action doctrine is treated most often
simply as a preliminary test for determining which cases are worthy to
proceed to the merits. It serves a boundary-like function for
determining whether constitutional rules apply but is seldom thought
to affect the substance of individual constitutional rights.
I propose in this Article that the state action doctrine, properly
understood, is not so much a boundary or threshold test, but is more
usefully applied as an analytical tool. That the state action doctrine
affects the extent to which constitutional norms apply to private
persons and entities is well understood-for example, whether the
First Amendment requires Disneyland to admit patrons who wear
offensive t-shirts. But what is less obvious is that the state action
doctrine also affects the substance of constitutional law, even as
applied to the government. 4 One reason for this is that courts are
likely to interpret constitutional provisions in light of their
understanding as to how broadly the rules they announce will apply.
Courts might, for example, be more willing to require highly speech-
protective conditions on government-owned sidewalks if they are
confident that such rules will be limited in scope and will not apply to
privately owned sidewalks. What is more, the state action doctrine
affects the substance of constitutional law by the way in which it
13. Although many scholars have critically examined the state action doctrine, see
infra note 20, most works address the state action doctrine as an isolated component of
constitutional law, treating the constitutional "merits" as a separate subject. While this is
consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of state action, the approach is too limited
for some analytical purposes. However, there are notable exceptions to this tendency. See
generally Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to
the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537 (1998)
(defending the public/private distinction as an element of the freedom of speech); Cass
Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 263-300 (1992) (examining free
speech theory in relation to the state action doctrine); Mark Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer
and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 383 (1988) (considering the equal
protection aspect of the state action doctrine).
14. In this Article, I use the term "merits," "substantive, and "substance" to refer to
the principles of constitutional law that do not concern the identity of the actor, as
distinguished from the state action component of constitutional law. I recognize that this
distinction is partially misleading. Indeed, one aim of this Article is to show that the
supposed "merits" and "state action" components of constitutional law are not so easily
separated from one another. I use this terminology only because it reflects the dominant
view that the state action issue is something other than a merits issue.
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causes constitutional questions to be framed for analysis.
Accordingly, it serves an analytical function. It only serves this
function well, however, when courts apply the state action doctrine in
a particular way.
This Article advocates a formal approach to state action as a
method of analyzing constitutional problems at the intersection of
public and private power. A formal approach to state action-or, in
other words, an approach that is literal and precise, rather than
functional-recognizes all forms of government action and even
inaction for purposes of constitutional law, including background
rules of common law, judicial enforcement of private rights, and
omissions of government officials. At the same time, it focuses the
ultimate constitutional inquiry on the actual part that the government
performed, recognizing without exception that only government
actors are subject to constitutional rules. According to the formal
approach, courts should not ask bluntly whether there is state action
or who should be deemed a state actor; instead, they should ask:
what role did the state or federal government actually play in relation
to the injury; and in so acting (or failing to act), did the government
behave unconstitutionally?
The formal state action approach differs from the way that courts
usually frame the state action analysis and would inevitably lead to a
new understanding of key constitutional rights. This is a potential
advantage. It does not, however, necessarily lead to a broader or
narrower application of existing constitutional rules. Indeed, a formal
state action doctrine does not by itself dictate any particular
outcomes. 5 Its role is analytical and rhetorical. It produces a clearer
picture of the questions that courts must ultimately decide in
interpreting the Constitution and, in so doing, enables constitutional
law to develop in a way that is more thoughtful and consistent.
Regardless of how one would interpret such principles as the freedom
15. For this reason, the formal approach to state action should not be confused with
the discredited version of legal formalism that proclaims that judges should decide cases
solely according to preexisting, objective doctrines and logical deduction. The method
proposed here does not deny the role of functional and outcome-based concerns in
constitutional interpretation, but would shift those concerns away from the state action
stage of analysis-focusing them instead in relation to the particular constitutional right at
issue. In this respect, a precise state action doctrine is consistent with legal process theory,
which recognizes the authority of legal texts and doctrines, but suggests that judges "rather
than simply apply doctrine in a mechanical fashion, use doctrine in the process of
reasoning towards a decision." NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 210 (1995). See generally Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J.
509 (1988) for a discussion of various concepts of legal formalism, including some that are
positive and should be embraced.
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of speech, due process of law, or equal protection, our constitutional
discourse concerning these rights would significantly improve if we
would apply the state action doctrine with literal precision.
The analysis will proceed in two parts. Part I explores the state
action doctrine and some of its current problems. It discusses various
approaches to identifying state action and suggests that, of these, a
formal approach is most likely to lead to sound constitutional analysis
and reasonable interpretation of constitutional rights.
Part II applies the formal conception of state action more
extensively to the problem of speech in publicly owned and privately
owned places. In the public forum speech context, the principal
advantage of a formal state action doctrine is not to change the
balance of power between those who would engage in public
expression and those who would restrict it; rather, it is to improve the
way we discuss and interpret the freedom of speech. Ultimately, I
suggest that a formal state action doctrine should lead us to focus
more directly on the substantive values of the First Amendment-
such as whether the government has preserved an adequate means of
communication for the speaker-rather than attach dispositive
significance to whether the location in question is publicly or privately
owned.
I. STATE ACTION QUESTIONS
The United States Constitution enables and restrains
government power. Its provisions do not directly control the conduct
of private individuals and organizations, no matter how harmful their
conduct may be.16 Accordingly, the state action doctrine holds that a
claim based on the Constitution must be dismissed if the alleged
injury is not the result of government wrongdoing. 7
The state action doctrine reflects a dichotomy between
government and the individual that is fundamental to Western
liberalism: government exists to protect individual freedom, and for
that purpose it must also be restrained. Limiting the scope of
government power (including federal judicial power) through
application of the state action doctrine serves not only to preserve
individual autonomy18 but also to further values of federalism and
16. The only exception is the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits the practice of
slavery. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
17. For purposes of this Article, the term "state action" refers to all government
action, including federal, state, and municipal.
18. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (the state action
doctrine "preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and
576 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83
separation of powers by leaving to Congress and the states the
primary authority to regulate conduct among individuals. 9
Although the state action doctrine is fundamental to
constitutional law, scholars have widely criticized the judiciary's
application of it.20 Many agree that "the field is a conceptual disaster
area." 21 Scholars have faulted the contemporary state action doctrine
for its failure to guide concrete cases in a meaningful way,22 for its
tendency to hide the underlying policy issues that courts must
balance, 23 and for its harmful effects on the politically powerless.
24
Indeed, the Supreme Court's first use of the state action doctrine was
to strike down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on the basis that Congress
had no authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit private racism,25 and for many decades later the state action
doctrine continued to serve as a primary defense for private racist
acts.26  Although more recent state action decisions found creative
federal judicial power.").
19. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) (stating that the state
action limitation serves "to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the
Framers' carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the National
Government.").
20. See, e.g., Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg
Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1330 (1982) (asserting that the state action
doctrine is intellectually inconsistent and invites manipulation); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985) (advocating the abolition of the
state action doctrine); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument
in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV.
302, 333-35 (1995) (describing the contemporary state action doctrine as overly formalistic
and in need of reform); Michael J. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State
Action Doctrine, 28 ST. Louis U. L.J. 683, 683 n.6 (1984) (arguing that the state action
doctrine is the product of contradictory liberal ideas and therefore will always be
incoherent). During the Civil Rights Era, harsh criticism of the state action doctrine was
even more prevalent. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action," Equal
Protection, And California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 91-95 (1967) (reviewing
the literature and concluding that "[tihe commentary confirms the inferences we would
draw from the decisions. The field is a conceptual disaster area.").
21. Black, supra note 20, at 95. Charles Black's famous description has been repeated
many times in the scholarly literature. He also called state action a "non-concept," id. at
91, and "a map whose every country is marked incognita," id. at 95.
22. Id. at 1690-91, 1698; see also Kevin L. Cole, Federal and State "State Action": The
Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 350 n.114 (1990)
(critiquing the emergence and application of the state action doctrine in state courts).
23. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 540.
24. See, e.g., id. at 546, 550; Brest, supra note 20, at 1330; see also Frances Olsen,
Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 CONST.
COMMENT. 319, 319-20 (1993) (exploring the gains that are made by power-holders who
are able to characterize their power as private and not public).
25. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
26. Thus, Charles Black critically wrote in 1967 that the state action doctrine:
r .....
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ways to impute state action in cases involving organized racism, thus
bringing those acts within prohibitions of the Constitution,27 those
decisions were often thought to be too creative, or at least imprecise
in their rationale, contributing to the impression that the state action
concept is both easily manipulated and inherently incoherent. 28
Given these problems, many commentators have argued that the state
action doctrine should be abolished altogether and replaced by a
balancing test in which interests of individual autonomy are weighed
directly and openly against other social interests.29 Others have
argued for more moderate solutions.30 In any case, it is fair to say that
today "commentators have achieved near unanimity in declaring the
unitary state action doctrine dysfunctional."'3
1
In this Section, I argue that the problems of the state action
doctrine arise principally from the way courts frame the issue. While
criticisms of the current state action doctrine are valid, we should not
abandon the core principle that the Constitution restrains and directs
only government actors. In fact, to abandon the state action doctrine
might have the unintended consequence of weakening constitutional
law in the end. To make the state action doctrine work as it should,
we need to state the question more accurately.
A. The Conventional Approach: Is There State Action?
When faced with a state action problem, courts usually focus on
"the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains," then ask
whether such conduct is "fairly attributable to the state."32 In other
[N]ow exists principally as a hope in the minds of racists (whether for love or
profit) that "somewhere, somehow, to some extent," community organization of
racial discrimination can be so featly managed as to force the Court admiringly to
confess that this time it cannot tell where the pea is hidden.
Black, supra note 20, at 95.
27. See generally Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (applying state action to a
segregated park); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (applying
state action to a restaurant serving only whites); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(applying state action to racially exclusive straw polls); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (applying state action to racially restrictive housing covenants); Smith v. Allright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944) (applying state action to racially exclusive primary elections).
28. See Phillips, supra note 20, at 685-700; Black, supra note 20, at 89-91, 95.
29. See infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 22, at 389-96 (arguing that there are good reasons why
state action doctrine should be less strict as applied to state constitutional law than as
applied to federal constitutional law); Krotoszynski, supra note 20, at 335-46 (arguing for
a more flexible use of state action criteria through meta-analysis).
31. Cole, supra note 22, at 343.
32. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295
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words, looking to the most proximate cause of the injury, courts ask
whether the ultimate decisionmaker was a government officer or
whether the action should be attributed to the government for some
other reason. For example, if someone sues a private association
under the First Amendment for imposing a rule restricting members'
speech, the first question framed is whether the rule should be
counted as state action.33 If there is a sufficient basis to find the
alleged conduct to be state action, the next step of the analysis
proceeds as if the government had directly imposed the rule; if there
is not a sufficient basis to find state action in the rule, the claim is
dismissed.
Two features of this conventional state action formula are
noteworthy. First, the state action inquiry occurs prior to, and
separate from, the merits of a constitutional claim. Our current state
action doctrine purports to be unitary-that is, it applies without
regard to the constitutional right at issue. Some commentators have
observed that the nature of a plaintiff's constitutional claim does
seem to influence state action determinations (in particular, courts
are more likely to find state action in cases involving racial
discrimination),34 but the Supreme Court has not acknowledged this,
and its decisions continue to treat the state action issue as if the
underlying merits are irrelevant. Second, the state action issue
presents an all-or-nothing question. Either there is state action, in
which case the ultimate act is attributed to the government, or there is
no state action, and the case is dismissed. No middle ground is
available.
The Supreme Court's two most recent state action decisions
employ this conventional method. In Brentwood Academy v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association,35 the Court found
that there was state action in a private interscholastic athletic
association's rules governing its members. The Court's opinion only
briefly mentions the plaintiff's constitutional claims in a cursory
(2001); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1999); Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
33. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 290-91 (examining "whether a statewide
association incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and
private schools may be regarded as engaging in state action when it enforces a rule against
a member school").
34. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062,
2331-32 (2002).
35. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
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background description.36 After finding the rules should be deemed
state action on the basis of the organization's general entanglement
with government officials, the Court remanded the case for further
consideration on the merits without discussing the nature or strength
of those claims.37
Likewise, in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Sullivan,38 the Court found that there was no state action in private
insurers' decisions to withhold payments pursuant to a state
regulatory scheme. Even though the plaintiffs framed their claim as
an attack on statutory procedures that the defendants followed,3 9 the
Court focused on the specific conduct of the private insurers.0
Finding that the ultimate insurance decisions were not fairly
attributable to the state, the Court held that the plaintiffs' claims must
fail due to lack of state action.41
In both cases, the Court first relied upon general state action
criteria 42 to decide whether the relevant action was attributable to the
state before even considering particular First or Fourteenth
Amendment claims. In both cases, the Court treated state action as
an all-or-nothing threshold issue.
The conventional approach to state action does not necessarily
produce unreasonable outcomes. It does, however, require certain
fictions to be sustained. The first is that some admittedly government
conduct does not count as state action for purposes of constitutional
law. The second is that some private acts must be deemed state
action, as if government officials had performed the actions directly.
These fictions are necessary to avoid extreme results under the
conventional approach, but they also have a tendency to obscure
rather than to assist the values served by the state action requirement.
36. Id. at 293.
37. Id. at 305.
38. 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
39. Id. at 50.
40. Id. at 51.
41. Id. at 58. The Court's state action holding applied to the claims against private
insurer defendants and not to claims against public insurers who were also in the case.
Interestingly, the Court went on to find that the decisions of public insurers to withhold
payments did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 58-61. As Justice Ginsburg
pointed out in her separate opinion, this holding on the merits made the Court's state
action determination unnecessary. Id. at 62 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
42. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text for a discussion and criticism of the
criteria courts purport to apply in state action cases.
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1. Fiction One: Background Rules and Remedies
The First Amendment begins with the words "Congress shall
make no law .... "' One might suppose that if anything counts as
government action for purposes of the First Amendment, it would be
a statute enacted by Congress.
Yet a majority of the en banc D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held
precisely the opposite in Alliance For Community Media v. FCC.' In
that case, the court dismissed a direct First Amendment challenge to
section 10 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 199245 on the basis that there was no state
action.46 The relevant statutory provisions authorized private cable
television operators to restrict indecent programming on leased-
access channels within their control.47 The en bans court framed the
issue as "whether section 10 and the [implementing] regulations
establish a 'sufficiently close nexus' between the government and
cable operators regarding indecent programming on access channels
so that state action is present."48 Examining the question at length,
the court found the nexus to be insufficient. The court concluded:
"Because we find no state action here.., we do not reach petitioners'
First Amendment attack on sections 10(a) and 10(c)."4 9
The Supreme Court later corrected the D.C. Circuit's basis for its
holding (affirming the judgment, in part, on the merits).5 0 One
wonders, however, how could the D.C. Circuit make such an apparent
error as to find no state action in a case directly challenging the
constitutionality of a statute?
The answer is that courts routinely engage in such fictions when
deciding state action issues. When courts frame the state action
inquiry in the conventional all-or-nothing way, they must be willing to
ignore some forms of literal state action, or every case would pass the
state action test. The statute examined by the D.C. Circuit, like many
principles of law, merely authorized private parties to act in a
particular manner; it did not require cable operators to alter their
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
45. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 533(f) (2000)).
46. See generally Alliance For Community Media, 56 F.3d at 113-23 (dismissing claims
that state action existed based on the "close nexus" between government and cable
operators and because section 10 has provided "significant encouragement").
47. Id. at 113.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 123.
50. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 772
(1996).
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programming, nor did it restrict anyone's programming directly. If
the state action requirement serves only a threshold function (as the
D.C. Circuit assumed), and if the presence of some background
principle of law authorizing private conduct is sufficient to pass that
threshold, then everything would be subject to constitutional
restraint. A private homeowner's decision to exclude someone from
her home on the basis of that person's speech would be subject to
First Amendment scrutiny because the common law of property
authorized her decision. A private employer's decision to terminate
an employee without cause would be subject to due process analysis
because employment law authorized the decision.
For this reason, courts are understandably reluctant to recognize
mere background principles of law as state action,51 even though this
means (if one takes the principle seriously) immunizing many
regulations, statutes, and common law rules from constitutional
review on the merits. The alternative, which courts are unwilling to
accept, would be to expand constitutional law so broadly as to
interfere with genuinely private behavior. The Supreme Court
recognized the need for this fiction in Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,2
where it explained:
It would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of our
previous cases, the notion of state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment to hold that the mere existence of a body of
property law in a State, whether decisional or statutory, itself
amounted to "state action" even though no process or state
officials were ever involved in enforcing that body of law.53
If background laws of property do not count as state action, what
about government enforcement of those laws? Puzzlingly, there are
some cases (including Flagg Brothers, as in the above quote)
suggesting that judicial or executive enforcement of private remedies
may satisfy the state action requirement, even in situations where the
underlying decisional law would not. The most famous of these
decisions is Shelley v. Kraemer,54 which held that judicial enforcement
51. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) (holding that
state regulation of private entity is insufficient to meet state action requirement even
though plaintiffs made a facial challenge to statutory procedures).
52. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
53. Id. at 160 n.10. Consistent with this fiction, the Supreme Court declined to find
state action in a private shopping mall's exclusion of First Amendment speakers from its
property, even though the common law of property authorized the exclusion. See
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976).
54. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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of a racially discriminatory covenant affecting the sale of housing
constituted state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.55
Shelley is generally considered, however, to be an exceptional
case.56 The problem with taking its rationale too far is that all private
rights and background principles of law depend upon the judiciary for
enforcement. A principle recognizing judicial enforcement as state
action is essentially as broad as a principle recognizing background
rules. Accordingly, courts do not always recognize judicial
enforcement alone as sufficient to pass the state action test. As the
California Supreme Court recently explained in a case involving a
property owner's restrictions on speech, broad recognition of the
Shelley principle "would effectively eviscerate the state action
requirement."57  Although Shelley has never been overruled, the
Supreme Court has often conspicuously ignored it,58 leading some to
conclude that it has been limited to its facts.59
In short, under the conventional state action approach, which
asks "Is there state action?" before proceeding to the merits, courts
are forced to limit their inquiry to only certain types of governmental
acts. Understood in this light, the D.C. Circuit's decision declining to
find state action in a case directly challenging a Congressional statute
was not extraordinary. 6 The difficulty is that there are no clear rules
for when this limiting fiction should be employed. Certainly, one
cannot say that all background rules and judicial remedies are
immune from constitutional scrutiny. If a state enacts a statute
permitting members of the public to trespass on the private property
of a disfavored newspaper publisher and interfere with the presses,
we should hope that a court would find the statute both reviewable
and unconstitutional.6 Fortunately, courts do not always apply the
background rules fiction, and, in any case, there is a second fiction to
55. Id. at 13, 19-20.
56. See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 526 (observing that the Supreme Court has
largely refused to apply Shelley); see also Cole, supra note 22, at 353 (noting that Shelley
may theoretically have a broad impact).
57. Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 810-11
(Cal. 2001). In Golden Gateway, the court rejected a freedom of speech challenge by
residential tenants against a landlord's rules prohibiting the distribution of leaflets in a
large private residential community. Id. at 810. The court dismissed the claim finding no
cognizable state action. Id. at 812.
58. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 526.
59. Cole, supra note 22, at 353.
60. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
61. Cf. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987) (government
action creating a public easement on private property is a taking of private property for
purposes of the Takings Clause).
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offset it.
2. Fiction Two: Traditional Government Function and Nexus Tests
The second fiction of the conventional state action doctrine is
that "the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual is to
be treated sometimes as if a State had caused it to be performed.
6 2
This expansion of the state action doctrine to encompass some private
behavior follows partially from the first fiction. If background rules
of law delegating power to private parties do not count as
government action (or at least do not usually count), then there must
be some other way for courts to prevent egregious conduct that
impairs constitutional values. The usual routes are the government
function and nexus tests.
According to the government function test, a private person may
be treated as a state actor when performing a function traditionally
reserved to the sovereign.63 A leading citation for this principle is
Marsh v. Alabama," where the Supreme Court held that a member of
the Jehovah's Witnesses had the right to distribute literature on the
streets of Chickasaw, Alabama, a company-owned town, contrary to
the owner's regulations." Marsh is often described as an exception to
the usual state action rule: the owner of Chickasaw, the Gulf
Shipbuilding Corporation, was deemed a state actor because it acted
like a government by managing a whole town with streets open to the
general public. Accordingly, the corporation was bound by principles
of the First Amendment in regulating speech.66 Understood in this
62. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295
(2001).
63. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991) ("Our
precedents establish that, in determining whether a particular action or course of conduct
is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine ... whether the actor is performing
a traditional governmental function"); id. at 624 (using public function test to determine a
private corporation's "state-actor status").
64. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
65. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508.
66. This is the contemporary interpretation of Marsh. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 158-59 (1978) (noting that Marsh applied the municipal function test to Gulf
Shipbuilding Corporation, which performed all the municipal functions in the town it
owned); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (reasoning that the
exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the state may
constitute state action); see also Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the
Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 627-28 (1991). It is interesting to note,
however, that the Supreme Court's opinion in Marsh does not rely upon the fiction that
the Gulf Shipbuilding Company should be deemed a state actor; rather, the Court focused
on the State of Alabama's acquiescence in the corporation's property rights and its
enforcement of those rights through judicial proceedings to base its decision on state
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manner, the government function test does not take literally the rule
that only government actors may violate the Constitution.67 The
Supreme Court has applied the government function test narrowly
but continues to acknowledge its validity as one means of restricting
private conduct through constitutional rules.6"
Courts also deem private conduct to be state action if "there is
such a close nexus between the state and the challenged action that
seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself."69  A leading example of the nexus principle is Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority," where the Supreme Court deemed a
private restaurant's policy of racial discrimination to be state action
because the restaurant leased space from a government agency,
thereby creating a symbiotic relationship between the government
and the restaurant.71 The nexus test is highly flexible and takes in a
variety of criteria. These criteria include, among other things,
whether government officials encouraged or coerced the private
conduct at issue, whether there is an interdependent relationship
between the government and the private actor,73 whether the state
and the private actor are joint participants in a public endeavor,74 and
whether government officials are entangled in the management or
action. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 501, 507.
67. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513-21 (1976) (discussing the public function
test as an exception to state action doctrine); see also Strickland, supra note 66, at 627
("[Tlhe government function doctrine permits the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to private conduct in which there is no official involvement.").
68. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the Supreme Court
reasoned that conduct traditionally reserved exclusively to the state may qualify as a
government function for purposes of deeming a private entity to be a state actor. Id. at
353. Since then, the Supreme Court has only once found state action under this theory,
and it was not the sole basis for the Court's opinion. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991) (holding that participation in the selection of a jury through
the use of peremptory challenges is a traditional government function and therefore
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment).
69. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (191)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
70. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
71. Burton, 365 U.S. at 715.
72. Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 296 (attributing private conduct to the state
"when the state provides significant encouragement, either overt or covert" (quoting Blum
v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
73. See, e.g., Burton, 365 U.S. at 723-25 (reasoning that the interdependent
relationship between a restaurant and the Wilmington Parking Authority created by lease
made the restaurant a state actor).
74. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982) (finding that
private holding party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed
property rendered them state actors).
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control of a private entity.
75
Like the government function test, the nexus test also represents
a fiction. By application of the test, private conduct may be
transformed into government conduct "as if a State had caused it to
be performed. 7 6 Granted, the nexus test requires some degree of
actual state involvement or presence, but it does not require that the
state participate in, or even have knowledge of, the specific decision
that ultimately is deemed state action. Nor does the nexus test
require such government control that the private actor would be a
government agent according to agency law.7  The nexus test
effectively allows a court to attach the label of state action to every
link in a causal chain, even though the actual state action may have
involved only one tenuous link. Then, when the issue proceeds to the
constitutional merits, it is forgotten whether the government was
thoroughly involved or only partially involved, for everything is
attributed as state action.
The government function and nexus tests follow from treating
the state action doctrine as an all-or-nothing threshold inquiry.
Because there is a component of state action in the background of
every case, courts must focus their inquiry on the specific act
producing injury and ask whether the state is fairly responsible. If it
were strictly required, however, to show that government officials
performed the final discretionary act for a claim to be cognizable,
constitutional law would be highly ineffective, so courts must
sometimes resort to functional doctrine to impute such conduct to the
government.
For the same reason that the government function and nexus
tests are needed under the conventional state action approach, they
are also hopelessly indeterminate. As courts have discovered, it is
impossible to develop any set rules for determining when a private
person should be fairly considered a state actor, so instead they have
created a list of criteria that are highly flexible and easily
manipulated. The product has been a string of outcomes based on
questionable distinctions:
75. See, e.g., Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 298 (holding that entwinement of state
officials in management and control of private athletic association rendered the
association a state actor).
76. Id. at 295.
77. Agency law requires both assent of the principal and control of the agent by the
principal for the existence of an agency relationship. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 1 (1957); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2001). Neither assent nor control, however, are required elements of state action under
the nexus test.
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The owner of a company town is a state actor because it
performs a traditional government function (even though many
private company towns have existed in the United States, some
even in the early 1800s).78
A public utility that supplies a community's electricity,
however, is not a state actor because it does not perform a
function "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State. 79
A large regional shopping center is not a state actor (although,
like a company town, it operates a community of businesses and
sidewalks open to the public) because it does not also own a
public sewer system and residential areas."0
A creditor who seizes a debtor's private property in the
presence of a sheriff is a state actor."'
A creditor who sells a debtor's property pursuant to statutory-
authorized self-help remedies is not a state actor.82
The Jaybird Democratic Association (a private political
association in Texas) is a state actor when it excludes racial
minorities from its county election poll because the poll is
virtually certain to determine the outcome of county elections.83
78. See generally Richard M. Candee, Early New England Mills Towns of the
Piscataqua River Valley, in THE COMPANY TOWN: ARCHITECTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE
EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE, 112-202 (John S. Garner ed. 1992); Introduction to THE
COMPANY TOWN: ARCHITECTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE, 3-
12 (John S. Garner, ed. 1992). Indeed, in Marsh, the Supreme Court noted the
commonality of company towns as part of the basis for its opinion. See Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 508-09 & n.5 (1946). More recent state action cases, however,
unconvincingly explain Marsh on the grounds that Chickasaw performed functions
traditionally reserved to governments. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158-59
(1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
79. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352-53.
80. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 516 (1976) (declaring that Marsh allows
private property to be treated as public only when all the aspects of a town are present,
including residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant, and a
business block). But cf id. at 539 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he crucial fact in Marsh
was that the company town owned the traditional forums essential for effective
communication; it was immaterial that the company also owned a sewer system and that
its property in other respects resembled a town.").
81. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982).
82. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157-66.
83. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953).
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The California Democratic Party, however, is not a state actor
when it wishes to exclude members of other parties from voting
in its primary election.'
A state interscholastic athletic association for secondary schools
is a state actor because of entanglement with government
officials.85
The National Collegiate Athletic Association, acting in concert
with a state-funded university, however, is not a state actor.86
It is no wonder that so many commentators have expressed
bewilderment at the Supreme Court's state action jurisprudence. It
has become a list of results and abstract criteria that are separated
from both the facts of state action as well as underlying constitutional
norms.
Courts are not really looking for state action when they decide
state action issues; current doctrine allows courts both to ignore state
action where it is literally present and to impute state action where it
is absent. Such free-wheeling functionalism might be excused if
courts were at least applying constitutional norms instead of rules.
But, here too, the conventional state action doctrine comes up short.
The state action doctrine purports to be a totality-of-the-
circumstances test, but it routinely excludes the most relevant set of
interests: those of the plaintiff and those of the government. Because
state action is separated from the merits, courts do not balance values
of freedom of speech, due process, or equal protection when deciding
state action issues (at least not so openly), but rather are left to
balance government functions, symbiotic relationships and pervasive
entanglements without any grounding in constitutional text or
purpose.
The most serious problem of the conventional state action
doctrine is that it is an empty exercise. It does not necessarily
produce wrong results. Rather, it is so malleable that no outcome is
excluded. Unfortunately, the factors that lead to current case
outcomes seem both artificial and incapable of principled application.
We should recognize that as long as courts continue to treat state
action as a threshold test, the doctrine will always have this problem.
Whether the conduct of X in performing Y is fairly attributable to Z
84. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573 (2000).
85. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 291, 298 (2001).
86. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191-99 (1988).
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will never be decided sensibly in the abstract.
B. The Formal Approach: What Is the Nature of the State Action?
And Is It Constitutional?
The Supreme Court has never discussed why it so often treats the
state action issue prior to the merits or why it phrases the question in
an all-or-nothing way. Nothing in the Constitution requires this.
Moreover, the Supreme Court does not uniformly apply the state
action doctrine in this manner. However there are some areas of
constitutional law where the Court has taken a different course.
Consider the First Amendment principle that government may
not establish religion. Certainly, the distinction between what is a
government act and what is a private act is as crucial to Establishment
Clause jurisprudence as it is to any other area of constitutional law.
And yet, in all the years the Supreme Court has been struggling to
define state action, not one of its Establishment Clause cases has
involved a disputed state action issue. This is a remarkable fact,
especially considering that so many difficult Establishment Clause
issues involve complicated relationships between government and
private actors. Indeed, Establishment Clause cases often raise the
same themes found in state action cases: problems of government
influence, entanglement between public and private officials, and
government assistance for private causes.
The reason that state action disputes do not appear in
Establishment Clause cases is that that the Supreme Court analyzes
the public/private relationship as a constitutional merits issue. This
does not mean that the state action doctrine does not apply to the
Establishment Clause. It certainly does apply. Without a state action
limitation, the Establishment Clause would prohibit any person,
public or private, from establishing religion or favoring one religion
over another. In Establishment Clause cases, however, courts define
the elements of state action more precisely than in other areas of
constitutional law. As a consequence, state action findings seldom
are disputed, and the difficult questions are reserved for the
constitutional merits. In Establishment Clause cases, there are no
state action fictions; there is no threshold test. The only question is
whether the state's actual conduct violates the Constitution.
For example, in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,87
the Supreme Court considered an Establishment Clause challenge to
a school district policy that allowed student-led, student-initiated
87. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
[Vol. 83
THE FORMAL STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
prayer at high school football games.88 The policy allowed students to
elect a representative, who, at the commencement of each home
football game, could voluntarily choose to deliver a message or
invocation to "solemnize" the event.89 By a divided vote, the
Supreme Court found the policy unconstitutional as an establishment
of religion.9"
The Court's method of analysis in Santa Fe is as noteworthy as its
conclusion. If the Court had applied the conventional state action
framework, the case would have turned on whether the final
decisionmaker, the student representative, fairly should be
considered a state actor while praying before a captive audience. If
the student representative was deemed a state actor, then it would be
unconstitutional for that state actor to lead a captive audience in
prayer. If the student was not a state actor, then the prayer was
private, and there would be nothing unconstitutional about the act.
The dispositive issue, in other words, would have been the state
action issue.
But neither the majority nor dissenting opinions framed the issue
in this way. Instead, both opinions focused on the government's
actual conduct: its policy permitting and arguably encouraging
student-led prayer, not the student representative's conduct.91 The
difficult issue on which the Justices disagreed was not whether the
district policy was state action (they knew it was), or whether the
student's conduct was state action (they knew it was not), but whether
the element of state action that was present-the district's policy-
amounted to an establishment of religion. The Supreme Court has
also sometimes employed a similar approach to state action in cases
88. Id. at 290.
89. Id. at 298 n.6.
90. Id. at 317.
91. See id. at 301 (quoting the question on which the Court granted certiorari:
"Whether [the school district's] policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at
football games violates the Establishment Clause."); id. at 301-17 (examining throughout
whether "the policy" is constitutional). But see id. at 318-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing the school district's policy does not violate the Establishment Clause). There is
one sentence of the majority's opinion that might be interpreted as slipping into the
conventional state action way of framing the issue, by focusing on the ultimate prayer,
rather than the school's policy: "The delivery of such a message-over the school's public
address system, by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of
school faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages
public prayer-is not properly characterized as 'private' speech." Id. at 310. But this
sentence is not made in the context of a state action finding, and in any case does not
appear to be necessary to the opinion. Indeed, as the Court later explains, it is not even
important to the Court's holding whether a prayer has even yet occurred under the policy.
Id. at 313-16.
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involving the Takings Clause92 and substantive due process.93
Two features of the formal or precise approach to state action
are worth noting. First, the formal approach recognizes all types of
state action. Background laws, common law rules, judicial and
administrative remedies, and even government inaction are all
cognizable for purposes of constitutional law.94 This means that state
action is always present, and there is no role for a threshold state
action test.95
Second, and equally important, the formal approach recognizes
only what the government has done (or not done) as state action. In
other words, the mere fact that there is a component of state action in
every case does not mean that every component consists of state
action. Nothing is attributed to the government except what the
government has actually done. If government officers stand idly by
and do nothing while one man destroys the property of another, the
question should be whether the government acted unconstitutionally
by doing nothing, not whether the private action should be attributed
to the government. A formal approach makes the definition of state
action easier, but sometimes makes the merits questions more
difficult.
The principal advantage of the formal approach is that it frames
the difficult questions in a way that allows courts to apply the
appropriate tools of interpretation. This does not make hard cases
easy, as the Court's Establishment Clause cases demonstrate, but it
92. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987) (affirming
government action that allows members of the public to traverse private land is a taking of
private property, even though private individuals ultimately cause the injury).
93. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70, 73 (2000) (holding that state law
allowing grandparents to acquire child visitation rights unconstitutionally denies parents
the fundamental right to control a child's upbringing, although grandparents are the
ultimate actors).
94. While state inaction may seem to be the antithesis of state action, there are many
ways in which government officials may violate the Constitution by failing to perform a
constitutional duty. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), provides a famous
example. See id. at 166-67 (explaining that an individual who is injured by an officer's
failure to perform a constitutional duty has recourse in courts of law). We therefore
cannot categorically exclude state inaction from constitutional scrutiny.
95. Several commentators have made this point persuasively. See, e.g., Chemerinsky,
supra note 20, at 520-26 (arguing that positivism instructs that all private infringements of
rights involve state action); Cass R. Sunstein, State Action Is Always Present, 3 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 465, 467-68 (2002) (arguing that state action is always present and that the issue is
rather the applicable constitutional guarantee). Too many commentators, however,
conclude from the truism that state action always exists in some form (if only because the
state has failed to prevent the injury in question) that there is no legitimate role for a state
action doctrine, other than a balancing function. See infra note 114. For a critique of
balancing proposals, see infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 83
2005] THE FORMAL STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 591
does make the inquiry substantially more meaningful. A formal
approach to state action brings the relevant constitutional policies
and normative values to bear upon the subject instead of forcing
courts simply to choose outcomes based on abstract verbal criteria
and raw intuition.
Consider, for example, the recent school voucher case, Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris.96 In that case, the Court considered whether it
violated the Establishment Clause for Ohio to provide tuition aid to
certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend
private schools of their choice, including religious schools.97 By
identifying the Ohio funding program as the relevant state action, the
Court applied a formal state action approach.
Rather than ask whether Ohio violated the Establishment Clause
by providing vouchers for religious education, however, what if the
Supreme Court had attempted to resolve the case using the clumsy
conventional state action fictions? The Court might have reframed
the issue as whether ostensibly private religious schools should be
deemed state actors based upon their acceptance of voucher funds
and other nexus factors. Under this approach, if the Court had
deemed the schools to be state actors, it would have followed that
they cannot teach religion. On the other hand, if the Court had not
deemed them to be state actors, then a participating school's ultimate
act of teaching religion would be exempt from constitutional scrutiny,
and the case would have been dismissed (ignoring, as the
conventional state action doctrine typically does, the government's
actual conduct that occurred prior to the ultimate act).
This approach to Zelman would have only confused the issue.
Even from the perspective of the dissenters who argued that the Ohio
program was unconstitutional, state action fictions were unnecessary
to the result they sought.9 8 There is no reason to make the state
action doctrine do the substantive work that the Establishment
Clause itself can do. All nine members of the Court treated Zelman,
appropriately, as a difficult Establishment Clause case, not as a
difficult state action case. The conventional state action model
96. 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding Ohio school voucher program, which allowed state
aid to religious schools through the private decisions of parents and students, against
Establishment Clause challenge).
97. See id. at 643-48 (describing the Ohio program's details); see also id. at 649
(describing the central question of the case as "whether the Ohio program.., has the
forbidden 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion.").
98. See id. at 684-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Ohio program
constitutes an establishment of religion); id. at 686-728 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same).
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provides no advantages and tends only to transform difficult
constitutional questions into more abstract ones. By identifying the
component of state action in every case with precision, courts have a
more accurate picture of the merits.
This is not to say that the conventional state action factors should
be irrelevant to constitutional analysis. It may matter a great deal
that government actors have encouraged or facilitated certain private
behavior or that government and private actors have become
entangled in such a way that private decisions have the appearance of
official endorsement. The relevance and weight of such factors,
however, are not apparent under the conventional state action
formula. They become apparent only when one identifies the
relevant state action literally, then considers the functional
considerations as part of the constitutional claim that is made,
whether that is an Establishment Clause claim, an Equal Protection
Clause claim, a Speech Clause claim, or some other constitutional
claim.
For example, why should we care that a private entity performs a
function traditionally reserved to governments? Does not the
government function test discourage states from experimenting with
new forms of privatization that may be beneficial? Proponents of the
conventional state action approach provide no answer except to
suggest that we must have some way of distinguishing what is
government and what is private other than by formal labels.99 The
distinction between government function and private function,
however, is both difficult to apply and flawed in principle. The same
distinction has been discredited in other areas of constitutional law.100
There are very few things that sovereign governments do that are not
also done by private entities.'0 1 In fact, it is possible that the only
99. Laurence H. Tribe justifies the public function test on essentially these grounds.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1705 (2d ed. 1988); see also
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) ("If
the Fourteenth Amendment is not to be displaced ... its ambit cannot be a simple line
between States and people operating outside formally governmental organizations.").
However, Professor Tribe's own example of a core government function, directing traffic
at a pedestrian street crossing, see TRIBE, supra, at 1705, shows the difficulty of this
distinction, for there are private universities who employ private policemen to direct
automobile and pedestrian traffic on their campuses.
100. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-47 (1985)
(discussing at length the Court's failed efforts to distinguish traditional sovereign functions
from non-sovereign functions in the fields of tax immunity and regulatory immunity, and
overruling earlier holdings based on that distinction).
101. Private homeowners associations, for example, impose land use regulations on
their members and impose taxes in the form of assessments. See Robert Ellickson, Cities
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truly exclusive governmental functions are those that governments
are constitutionally obligated to perform, such as providing jury trials
before inflicting criminal punishment. If a state delegates a function
that it is constitutionally obligated to provide, however, the
delegation itself may become the basis of a constitutional complaint.
One does not need to impute state action to a private entity to hold
that states cannot privatize certain functions with constitutional
significance.102 On the other hand, if a state is not constitutionally
obliged to provide a particular service, such as sewer service, it should
not matter if by coincidence only government entities have provided
such services in the past.
Moreover, one does not need the public function test to
determine who is the government in the first instance. Under a
formal approach, state actors include the United States, the fifty
states, and all officers, agencies, and divisions thereof. Moreover,
cities are state actors because they are created with state authority by
the non-unanimous consent of their subjects. 103
To be sure, if the United States, states, and cities are able to
decide by designation who qualifies as a government officer of agency
for purposes of constitutional law, there must be some way to ensure
that these designating governments do not use private actors to
and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1521-26 (1982) (finding no
functional distinction between cities and homeowners associations). Other private entities
provide police services, operate streets and traffic lights, have elections, and engage in civil
dispute resolution.
102. Moreover, there are likely some functions that states may constitutionally
delegate to private actors but that they must ensure are constitutionally adequate, such as
legal counsel for criminal defendants and health care for prisoners. Once again, there is
no need to impute state action to make the state's constitutional obligation meaningful. In
these circumstances, if a private actor fails to perform, we may say that the state has failed
its constitutional duty to ensure that adequate services are provided. Whether a private
actor who is delegated a constitutionally significant duty may be personally liable for
errors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a separate question of statutory interpretation. Compare
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 345 (1981) (holding that public defenders do not act
"under color of state law" for purposes of § 1983, although paid by the state), with West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988) (holding that physician acted "under color of state law"
when treating prisoner under contract with the state). However, the content of the state's
constitutional obligation does not require imputing state action to private individuals.
103. As Robert Ellickson has shown by comparing private residential associations to
municipalities, the defining distinction between government entities and private entities is
not the set of functions that they perform (which in all outward respects may be identical),
but the source of their power. Private associations are formed only by the unanimous
consent of those who are bound by the association, whereas sovereign governments are
formed by the non-unanimous will of the people. See Ellickson, supra note 101, at 1523-
26. This distinction further explains why government associations and private coercive
associations often receive differing legal treatment. Id. at 1523.
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accomplish unconstitutional ends. As the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause cases show, it is possible to prevent abuses by
applying the merits of constitutional law."° The same approach may
just as easily work for other constitutional rights.
For example, if it is constitutionally troubling for government
actors to become "entangled" with private associations who restrict
the speech of their members on the basis of content, a court could
explore this relationship using the values associated with the freedom
of speech. Is such public versus private entanglement troubling
because it could serve to mask an illegitimate government purpose to
suppress speech? Is it troubling because it creates the public
appearance that the government endorses the organization's speech
restrictions? Or is it troubling because the relationship simply results
in the suppression of too much speech? No matter what the free
speech concerns, we would do better to focus on them directly and
openly, asking whether the government (meaning the United States, a
state, a city, or some official department thereof) has acted
unconstitutionally in its relationship to the private actor who caused
harm, rather than to employ some vague attribution principle to
reach the desired outcome. 105 There is no added value in rephrasing
the constitutional issue as whether a formally private association
should be deemed a state actor.10 6
An advantage of the formal state action approach is that it allows
courts to tailor the scrutiny of government actor and private actor
104. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
105. Indeed, in the area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
significantly refined its entanglement test by considering its relation to the role of the
Establishment Clause. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997) (explaining the
factors that are relevant to entanglement and concluding "[I]t is simplest to recognize why
entanglement is significant and treat it . .. as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's
effect"). It is unlikely that such a refinement would be possible under a conventional state
action approach.
106. Of course, it may be that some formally private entities are so thoroughly
controlled by government officers that it would be unconstitutional in all circumstances for
the state to allow them to behave contrary to the same constitutional rules that bind actual
government agencies. Thus, we might say, for brevity, that these entities should be
"deemed" state actors. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995)
(holding that Amtrak is a state actor because it furthered government objectives, for
which it was statutorily created, and was subject to government control); see also
Krotoszynski, supra note 20, at 327 (discussing other government-controlled
corporations). This is the only circumstance in which this deemed-a-state-actor
terminology works well, and in any case, we should recognize that it is only an
abbreviation for what we are really saying under the merits: government may not create
private entities that in all relevant respects are controlled by the government and do the
work of the government, without ensuring that those entities adhere to constitutional
rules.
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relationships to the particular constitutional right at stake. Rather
than employ a one-size-fits-all functional test to protect a wide range
of constitutional values, a formal state action doctrine examines the
public versus private relationship, including functional aspects of that
relationship, in relation to the text and values of specific
constitutional provisions. Given the variety of provisions, normative
values, and historical experiences that make up constitutional law,
this flexibility and precision is essential for reasonable constitutional
analysis.
Accordingly, some constitutional provisions, like the Takings and
Due Process Clauses, should in general prohibit the government from
authorizing private actors to do those things that are also forbidden to
the government. For example, government may not authorize,
without compensation, one individual to trespass permanently on the
land of another, regardless of the government's intent.1 7 One does
not need a functional state action test to reach this result; it is the
government's authorization for the trespass that is unconstitutional.
In some cases, these clauses might even impose an affirmative duty on
government officials to protect rights of life, liberty, and property
against private injury.108
Other provisions, such as the Establishment and Speech Clauses,
do not generally prevent the government from authorizing private
conduct that would be forbidden to the government. Otherwise, it
would be unconstitutional for the government to give a building
permit for the construction of a private church. Instead, the
Establishment Clause prohibits government authorizations of
religious conduct only where there is an illegitimate governmental
purpose or discriminatory effect behind the authorization or where
the authorization creates the appearance of government
endorsement. 109
Yet another provision, the Equal Protection Clause, should
inquire further into broader social effects and a historical concern for
particular groups. Thus, while it may generally be constitutional for
government to allow private individuals to act in a racially
107. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
108. But see Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 201
(1989) (holding that the Due Process Clause imposes no affirmative duty on state welfare
agencies to prevent private child abuse).
109. See, e.g., Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600-01 (1989) (holding that
the county decision to allow a private Christian group to display nativity scene at
courthouse was unconstitutional, as conveying a message of government religious
endorsement).
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discriminatory manner (something, of course, government itself may
not do), and even sometimes to enforce the racist choices of private
property owners, there is a limit to this principle where property
rights are used systemically to block minorities from important
benefits such as housing. The issue in Shelley v. Kraemer,"'
therefore, more accurately should have been phrased as whether the
state's enforcement of privately created, racially discriminatory
covenants caused such a severe disparate impact for African-
Americans that such enforcement would deny equal protection of the
law,"' rather than whether the racist terms of the covenant should be
attributed to the government, as if the government had authored
them directly. Understood in this manner, Shelley is distinctively an
equal protection/housing case; it does not imply that all private
covenants must comply with all constitutional rules if they are to be
enforceable.
Given the variety of rights and values that the Constitution
protects, it is implausible to expect a generic functional state action
doctrine to police adequately the relationship between government
and private actors for all constitutional purposes. A formal approach
to state action does not try. Instead, it serves appropriately to frame
and limit the relevant constitutional question, which in every case
must be decided under some specific constitutional provision.
C. The Anti-Doctrinal Approach: Whose Interests Weigh More?
A third approach to state action, supported by several scholars"2
and one state court,'13 differs from both the conventional and formal
approaches. Under this approach, the state action doctrine is
replaced with a general balancing test. Enough commentators, in
fact, have suggested that courts should give up the search for state
action in favor of direct weighing of interests that we may call it the
conventional scholar's solution.
14
110. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing
Shelley).
111. See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 384-91, for a discussion of how one might rephrase
Shelley's holding in substantive equal protection terms, rather than in conventional state
action terms.
112. See infra note 114.
113. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980). See discussion infra note 119 and
accompanying text.
114. Mark Tushnet has referred to the balancing approach as the "conventional
analysis" of scholars, which they "are almost unanimous in accepting." See Tushnet, supra
note 13, at 389-91. Notable examples include: Chemerinsky, supra note 20, passim;
Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth
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Erwin Chemerinsky is the strongest proponent of the idea that
courts should abolish the state action doctrine." 5  According to
Chemerinsky, the state action doctrine serves to shield private
wrongdoers who violate the rights of innocent victims for no
legitimate reason.116 To the extent that it is important to preserve a
sphere of individual autonomy for some private actors, courts would
do better to balance that interest directly against the rights of victims,
rather than use arbitrary state action criteria to protect many
wrongdoers." 7  By eliminating the state action limitation,
Chemerinsky suggests, "the Constitution would be viewed as a code
of social morals, not just of governmental conduct, bestowing
individual rights that no entity, public or private, could infringe
without a compelling justification."'18
Most courts have consistently rejected this approach by adhering
to some form of the state action doctrine. One exception, however, is
the New Jersey Supreme Court, which has applied this very balancing
approach for purposes of state constitutional law. In State v.
Schmid,"9 the court considered whether the speech clause of the New
Jersey State Constitution required Princeton University to allow the
public to enter its campus and engage in political speech. The court
held first that the state action doctrine does not apply to the state
constitution's freedom of speech guarantee; instead, the state
constitution prohibits public or private persons from unreasonably
restricting the speech of others. 20 Accordingly, whether the public
may engage in expressive activities on Princeton's private property
should be determined by balancing the owner's property rights
against the public's right of free expression.'21 Applying the test, the
court found that because Princeton had opened its campus to the
Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SuP. Cr. REV. 221, 259-61 (1976); Harold
W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208, 208-09, 221 (1957); Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action,
41 TEX. L. REV. 347, 389-90 (1963). While some commentators do not phrase their
proposed solution in terms of abolishing the state action concept, see, e.g., Glennon &
Nowak, supra, at 261, their analysis is similar to the others in that they would interpret the
Constitution to proscribe some private behavior and use a balancing test to determine
when that is, avoiding both conventional state action fictions and formal state action
limitations. See id. at 261.
115. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 550-57.
116. Id. at 540.
117. Id. at 536-42.
118. Id. at 550.
119. 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
120. Id. at 628.
121. Id. at 629-30.
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public in a way that should be conducive to public dialogue and had
made the pursuit of knowledge its mission, the balance favored the
public's right to use the private campus to spread its political ideas.'22
This post-modernist rejection of the state action doctrine,
supported by Chemerinsky and the New Jersey Supreme Court,
shares some advantages with the formal approach. It avoids the
artificial distinctions of the conventional state action doctrine and its
tendency to hide the underlying values that matter in state action
decisions. The balancing approach is therefore more open than the
conventional approach. By focusing a court's inquiry on the
consequences of its decision for the parties, a balancing approach may
do a better job of protecting some societal interests that are
overlooked by a blind application of abstract state action criteria. For
example, the balancing approach might recognize that private
property rights-particularly where they are divided unevenly in
society-have the potential to, deprive some people, for all practical
purposes, of their freedom of speech, and that private property rules
can be just as oppressive as the government's own statutes restricting
speech.
The balancing approach, as its proponents point out, is also
sufficiently flexible that in theory it need not lead to extreme
results.123 This is because a private actor's interests in being free to
violate constitutional norms are part of the balancing test. Many
would be legitimately troubled, for example, if the Constitution were
interpreted as prohibiting any private homeowner from
discriminating on the basis of religion, race, or speech viewpoint in
deciding whom to invite for dinner. If application of a particular
constitutional rule to a private person would interfere with that
person's freedom of association,'24 however, a court could hold that
the freedom of association outweighs the other constitutional
interests at stake. The same kind of answer may be given in any case
where the application of a constitutional rule to a private person
would seem to cause unjust results. 25
Notwithstanding its openness and flexibility, however, the
balancing approach is an unwise solution to current state action
122. Id. at 630-32.
123. See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 538.
124. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-Amer. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 559
(1995) (holding that private parade sponsor has a federal constitutional right to exclude a
group on the basis of viewpoint from participation in the parade even though state law
would prohibit the sponsor's discrimination).
125. See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 538.
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problems. It does much more than open the decisionmaking process
of courts to scrutiny. It also applies some far-reaching assumptions
about the meaning of constitutional rights and the role of courts in
enforcing those rights. Among these assumptions are that courts
generally should enforce constitutional rights by balancing the
interests of affected individuals; that private parties ideally should
adhere to the same standards of conduct as governments (absent
some convincing reason to the contrary); and, notably, that the
judiciary has the power and responsibility to impose constitutional
standards of conduct on private parties.
These assumptions are not warranted, at least not as
generalizations for all of constitutional law. The enthusiasm of
scholars to suggest balancing as a solution to difficult state action
questions tends to overlook other tools of interpretation that should
come first, as well as structural considerations that limit the power of
courts. If we understand the Constitution as law, and not merely as a
tool of judicial power, the role of balancing is at most secondary. The
question courts should ask in the first instance is not whether it would
increase social utility for a federal court to prohibit X from harming
Y, but rather, whether it is unconstitutional for the government to
allow X to harm Y. This might lead to a balancing resolution, or it
might not, but it is a mistake for courts to jump straight to balancing
without first considering the legal meaning of the constitutional right
in question. The balancing approach, in effect, asks courts to do
precisely this.
The presumption that private parties are subject to constitutional
norms absent some compelling reason to the contrary is especially
dangerous.'2 6  As a matter of constitutional interpretation, this
presumption is untenable, unless we revise the traditional
understandings of many core constitutional rights. Not only are the
Constitution's provisions explicitly written as restraints on
government power, they are designed to prevent evils that for the
most part are distinctly governmental in nature."2 7
126. Some scholars, including Chemerinsky, would have courts begin with this as the
presumptive rule and ask whether there are adequate reasons to exempt a private
individual's conduct. See, e.g., id. at 550 (arguing that a "compelling justification" should
be required to exempt private actors from constitutional standards); Black, supra note 20,
at 100-03 (supporting prima facie rule that private actors are bound by constitutional
norms); Black, supra note 20, at 94-95 (discussing other commentators).
127. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 146-47 (2003) (arguing that the purpose of rights is not to protect
individuals from coercion, but rather to protect individuals from coercion by the wrong
type of institution).
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Take government censorship of speech. What is most troubling
about government speech censorship is not that a speaker's message
is subject to viewpoint discrimination per se. The Speech Clause, in
fact, presupposes that private listeners and distributors of
information, such as bookstores and newspapers, must have the
freedom to make viewpoint-based decisions that will affect the ability
of speakers to spread their message.128 The constitutional norm
against censorship is linked to the government's special role as a
sovereign. The Speech Clause, in effect, provides that government
should not restrict speech on the basis of disagreement with the
speaker's message precisely so that private parties will have the
freedom to make their own viewpoint-based and content-based
evaluations. 129  Therefore, to speak of a private person violating
another's freedom of speech by engaging in viewpoint-based
censorship (even as a mere presumption) is to change, and in a sense
turn upside down, the core meaning of the freedom of speech. 130
Or, imagine a dispute under the Establishment Clause between a
person who builds a religious monument on private land and a
neighbor who finds the monument offensive. In a balancing regime, a
court would "eliminate completely the state action inquiry and, in
each case, ask directly whose liberty should be upheld, the violator's
or the victim's." 131  As applied to an Establishment Clause claim,
however, this test is highly misleading. The primary flaw is not that
religious adherents have a constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion (the balancing test is capable of recognizing this), but more
fundamentally that the Establishment Clause is not concerned with
128. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-58 (1974)
(upholding newspaper's right to refuse to publish a response by someone whose
reputation is questioned in an earlier article).
129. For example, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803
(2000), the Court explained:
When a student first encounters our free speech jurisprudence, he or she might
think it is influenced by the philosophy that one idea is as good as any other, and
that in art and literature objective standards of style, taste, decorum, beauty, and
esthetics are deemed by the Constitution to be inappropriate, indeed unattainable.
Quite the opposite is true .... What the Constitution says is that these judgments
are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the
mandate or approval of a majority.
Id. at 818.
130. Of course, private censorship may cause real harm, but the harm is qualitatively
different from that of government censorship. An author may lose money or be offended
if bookstores choose not to carry a book because of its content, but the author is likely to
be outraged and feel civilly wronged if the government bans the book from stores.
131. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 537.
[Vol. 83
2005] THE FORMAL STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 601
private religious establishments. By proposing that courts balance
two supposed liberty interests-one person's interest in religious
worship, and another person's interest in not being exposed to
someone else's religious worship-when one of those interests is not
grounded in the Constitution, the balancing approach invites
manipulation and devaluation of actual constitutional rights. It not
only purports to place weight on interests that should be irrelevant to
constitutional analysis (and thus, should more properly be a subject
for zoning authorities rather than federal courts), but may also divert
attention away from government action that is relevant.132
The New Jersey Supreme Court may have made this very
mistake in Schmid. By upholding the public's right to use Princeton's
campus as a public forum, the court enhanced the rights of some
people. But two aspects of the decision are troubling from the
perspective of private liberty (interests which the court neglected to
balance). First, the court substituted its own judgment for that of
Princeton University in deciding how the University's educational
mission is best accomplished on its campus-a questionable intrusion
into academic and institutional freedom.'33 Second, the court gave no
consideration to the University's own freedom of speech interests,
including its right to participate in the search for knowledge free of
government-imposed speech rules. The court only valued Princeton's
interests as a property owner, not as a First Amendment speaker in
its own right. 34 The balancing test was therefore slanted towards
error. If the primary value of the freedom of speech is to prevent
government-imposed orthodoxy,'35 Schmid has it backwards. 3 6  It
132. Suppose, in the example given, that the city planning authority engaged in
religious discrimination in authorizing or promoting the particular religious monument.
The private interests of two property owners may be no different, but the legal
authorization for the monument would be unconstitutional because of the government's
discriminatory actions. A balancing approach would not necessarily recognize the
significance of how the government treats others in like circumstances.
133. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d. 615, 631 (N.J. 1980) (finding that the defendant's
speech was not incompatible with the University's professed educational goals); id. at 632
(finding unreasonable a University's rule requiring prior approval to disseminate materials
on campus).
134. As Julian Eule and Jonathan Varat remark in criticism of Schmid: "The notion
that a university might embrace free speech but give it a different cast-and that this very
process of definition might itself be protected by the First Amendment-seems never to
have occurred to the New Jersey court." Eule & Varat, supra note 13, at 1577-18
(footnote omitted).
135. As Justice Jackson famously wrote: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .... W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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holds, in essence, that to engage in higher education, a private
institution must follow the model of government universities with
regard to campus speech, or at least have a convincing reason for
choosing to deviate.
Even if one agrees with the outcome in Schmid, the case
illustrates a danger of abandoning the state action doctrine. Interest
balancing is an inherently subjective process,'37 particularly where one
supposed constitutional right is "weighed" against another. If courts
become too comfortable with this method, it may not always serve to
prevent tyranny; rather, it may result in a new form of tyranny. It is
far safer for courts to recognize the Constitution solely as a limitation
and authorization of government power, not as grounds for a
judicially prescribed code of social conduct.
D. Summary
The state action doctrine is not so much a boundary as it is a
mode of constitutional analysis. The three modes of analysis
discussed here-the conventional approach, the formal approach, and
the balancing approach-are all able to prevent conduct that violates
constitutional norms. All three are also flexible enough to allow
room for individual autonomy. The primary difference between these
approaches is in the questions that they ask prior to reaching a
conclusion. The conventional approach asks, "is there state action?,"
but must take a flexible view of what counts as state action. The
formal approach asks, "what is the nature of the state action and is it
constitutional?" The balancing approach disregards the state action
inquiry altogether and asks instead, "whose interest weighs more?"
Of the three approaches, the formal approach is the most likely
to lead to well-reasoned analysis and accurate constitutional results.
It is also the most neglected mode of state action analysis, both in
cases and commentary, perhaps because it is so simple. It does not
require the problematic fictions of the conventional state action
doctrine. It also avoids the distortions and dangerous presuppositions
of the balancing approach. It is more faithful than either of these
alternatives to the concept that the Constitution only restrains
government power and leaves to Congress and the states the primary
authority to regulate private conduct.
136. See Eule & Varat, supra note 13, at 1575-80, 1617-34 (critiquing Schmid and
similar intrusions into private association freedoms on anti-orthodoxy grounds).
137. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 788-90
(2001) (describing the misleading nature of the balancing metaphor in First Amendment
analysis).
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II. How STATE ACTION AFFECTS THE MERITS: THE PUBLIC
FORUM EXAMPLE
One reason that the courts may feel compelled to apply a flexible
state action doctrine may be that they are assuming a fixed
understanding of certain substantive constitutional rights. To apply a
formal state action doctrine across the full range of constitutional law
without also reexamining the merits of constitutional law would, in
fact, cause serious problems. This may indicate, however, that courts
are distorting state action doctrine to compensate for other problems
in constitutional law. If courts would consider reexamining the
substantive merits of constitutional law, the formal approach to state
action doctrine would become both feasible and useful. Indeed, its
primary value might be to improve the way we understand and
discuss basic rights such as the freedom of speech, equal protection,
and due process.
This Section will explore this aspect of state action doctrine by
examining in greater depth the problem raised in the introduction:
the freedom of speech in government-owned and privately owned
places.'38  I conclude that the freedom of speech public forum
doctrine is arguably both overly strict as applied to government
property and under-inclusive as applied to private property and that
the conventional state action doctrine is responsible for both
problems. A formal approach to state action, by contrast, suggests a
uniform flexible standard for both public-property and private-
property speech restrictions.
A. The Public Forum Doctrine's Relationship to State Action
Under current First Amendment interpretation, whether a
person has a right to use government-owned land for freedom of
speech purposes depends largely upon how the location is classified.
The Supreme Court has identified several classifications of
government property for this purpose. These include the traditional
public forum (in general, sidewalks and parks), the designated public
forum, and the nonpublic forum. 39 In a traditional or designated
138. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
139. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676-78 (1998);
Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992). In Forbes, the
Court also suggested a fourth category of analysis-where the resource is "not a forum at
all." 523 U.S. at 678. The defining characteristic of this category, however, does not
appear to be geographically based, but rather based on the type of government decision at
issue. See id. at 674-75 (noting that public broadcasting editorial decisions are not
generally subject to forum scrutiny, although political candidate debates are an exception).
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public forum, the government bears a heavy burden to justify
restrictions on speech, even when there are other nearby locations
where speakers may effectively engage the public. 4' In a nonpublic
forum, speech restrictions are easier to justify, but must still be
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. 4 '
How to distinguish between a traditional public forum-where
heightened scrutiny applies-and a nonpublic forum-where lower
scrutiny applies-has proven to be a difficult problem in the law, both
practically and theoretically. Cases suggest that a traditional public
forum is identified by objective characteristics not solely by
government intent.'42 But what kinds of objective characteristics
define a traditional public forum, and why should these characteristics
matter for purposes of measuring a person's freedom of speech?
Difficult forum classification cases have included sidewalks serving
specific buildings, 43 common areas of airports,' 44 and pedestrian
plazas with distinctive architectural characteristics. 45
Some commentators who have explored forum classification
problems have concluded that the distinction between traditional
public forums and nonpublic forums is unsupportable. 46 Some, such
140. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 678 (explaining that a restriction on speech in a public forum
is subject to the "highest scrutiny" and must be "narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling
state interest").
141. Id. at 685.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,180 (1983) (" 'Congress ... may not
by its own ipse dixit destroy the "public forum" status of streets and parks which have
historically been public forums ....... (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic
Assoc., 453 U.S. 114, 133 (1981))); see also United States. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737-38
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[W]e must recognize that certain objective
characteristics of Government property and its customary use by the public may control
the case.").
143. Compare Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (plurality opinion) (finding that a postal
sidewalk is a nonpublic forum), with id. at 737-38 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting
that a postal sidewalk might be a traditional public forum under an objective test), and id.
at 742-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that postal sidewalk is a traditional public
forum).
144. Compare Lee, 505 U.S. at 680-81 (finding that an airport is a nonpublic forum),
with id. at 693-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that an airport is a traditional public
forum).
145. Compare First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308
F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 2002) (ruling that a public plaza is a public forum, regardless of
government intent), with Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union v. City of N.Y.
Dept. of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 553 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that a public plaza
is a either a limited public forum or nonpublic forum), and Hawkins v. City of Denver, 170
F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a pedestrian area at the center of a performing
arts complex is not a public forum).
146. For criticisms of the modern public forum doctrine as formalistic, see Daniel A.
Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and
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as Geoffrey Stone, propose instead that all government-property
speech restrictions should be subject to a uniform heightened
standard that asks whether private speech would be compatible with
the government's normal use of the property. 147 Why should the First
Amendment's scrutiny of time, place, and manner regulations be
relaxed, they say, simply because the location in question does not
look or function like a traditional sidewalk or park, if it would be
equally compatible for public speech?
Commentators who critique the Supreme Court's forum
classification approach, however, often define the problem narrowly:
what level of scrutiny should apply to speech regulations affecting
government property? The general debate about public and
nonpublic forums, in other words, has occurred within a framework
that assumes that only government property would be subject to
whatever uniform rule is imposed-that the First Amendment
generally provides no right of access to the private property of
another for purposes of communicating a message. This assumption
is consistent with current state action cases. Nevertheless, it has an
effect on the arguments concerning the public forum doctrine. It is
easier to argue persuasively for heightened scrutiny of speech
regulations affecting government property if this is the only domain
where such scrutiny would apply. Moreover, if private property
speech restrictions are pervasive and cannot be challenged under the
First Amendment, this raises the stakes for speech on government
property, strengthening the case for why courts should jealously
protect speech in that domain. 48
Taking a different approach, there are other scholars such as
Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1226-35 (1984); Robert C.
Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1758-64 (1987); Keith Werhan, The Supreme Court's
Public Forum Doctrine and the Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 335, 399-410
(1986).
147. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 94
(1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Forum Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. Cr.
REV. 233, 253-61 (1971). For similar proposals, see Mark Cordes, Property and the First
Amendment, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 68-69 (1997) (proposing a uniform compatibility
standard); Werhan, supra note 146, at 410-26 (proposing a uniform functional standard);
see also Farber & Nowak, supra note 146, at 1235-45 (proposing a uniform balancing test
based on the nature of the restraint). The Supreme Court once suggested a uniform
compatibility standard for government property speech restrictions in Grayned v.
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972), but more recent decisions have entrenched the
forum-classification approach. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
148. See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 147, at 88 (discussing practical
importance of government property to the freedom of speech, especially since private
owners often do not make their property generally available for speech).
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Curtis Burger who argue that the freedom of speech should apply
more expansively to privately owned locations that bear the
characteristics of traditional public forums, such as regional shopping
malls and private university campuses.149 They would, in other words,
challenge the conventional state action doctrine.
Interestingly, these are not the same scholars who would replace
the public forum doctrine with a uniform time, place, and manner
standard, although both groups seek to strengthen the freedom of
speech. There are both practical and theoretical reasons why these
positions do not coalesce. First, a rule that would subject all
property-public and private-to a uniform heightened free speech
standard, regardless of public forum characteristics, would be
intolerably broad. Second, those such as Burger who argue that
speech restrictions should apply more expansively to some privately
owned locations emphasize the objective similarities between
traditional public forums and comparable locations that are privately
owned.15° To make this comparison, they affirmatively rely on the
kinds of objective criteria (such as whether the location serves as a
center of commerce or has multiple points of entry) that those who
criticize the public forum doctrine argue should not affect the
standard of review.
Thus, in deciding how to analyze the public forum doctrine, one
must make an initial choice. By limiting time, place, and manner
scrutiny to government property only, it is easier to argue for a more
speech-protective standard in that domain. Alternatively, by limiting
heightened scrutiny to locations that serve objectively as traditional
public forums, it is easier to argue that privately owned public forums
such as shopping malls should also be included. Accordingly, one
group argues in the interest of free speech that there is something
special about government property; 1' another group argues in the
interest of free speech that there is nothing special about government
149. See Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 654-59 (1991); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, More Speech is Better, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1635 (1998) (arguing that free speech interests of individuals are generally
more important than the speech interests of private institutions); Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1008-10 (1982) (arguing that the
property rights associated with an expansive commercial setting are outweighed by the
personal right of freedom of speech); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 294-95 (promoting free
speech around areas such as "mailboxes, airports, train stations, [and] broadcasting
stations").
150. See Berger, supra note 149, at 654-55.
151. Cordes, supra note 147, at 27-28; Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note
147, at 88-94.
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property. 52
This division shows that there is a probable trade-off between the
stringency of our public forum protections and the range in which
those protections apply. It is likely that courts appreciate this
balance, even in applying and formulating existing First Amendment
standards. If so, then the content of our public forum doctrine, and
the arguments concerning it, depend directly upon how one
understands and applies the state action doctrine. Integral to the
question of what type of First Amendment standard should protect
speech on government-owned land is the question of whether this
standard should also apply to the domain of private property.
B. Speech Boundaries Under the Traditional State Action Approach
The starting point of the traditional state action doctrine is
simple and talismanic. There is no state action when government
punishes a trespasser for speaking on private property without
permission from the owner, unless the owner operates a company
town. 53 Of course, this is a fiction,154 but it is a fiction deemed
necessary for the protection of individual autonomy and private
property values. 55
The current state action doctrine's broad exemption of private
property for constitutional purposes makes the argument for
heightened speech protection on government property stronger. If
government-owned places are the only locations to which the First
Amendment public forum doctrine applies, it is even more crucial to
form a policy perspective that jealously guards speech in this domain
so there remain adequate avenues for public expression. Moreover,
this geographic limitation allows courts to strengthen the public
forum doctrine while doing less damage to competing social interests
(such as the value of privacy, autonomy, and variety in land use),
since the doctrine only applies to government-owned places.156
152. Berger, supra note 149, at 655-59 (concluding that public or private ownership is
irrelevant to whether a location has the traditional characteristics of a public forum).
153. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,513-17 (1976).
154. As Jeremy Bentham wrote, "Property and law are born together, and die
together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property
ceases." Jeremy Bentham, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (Hildreth trans., 1871).
155. See, e.g., Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797,
808, 811 (Cal. 2001) (holding that a tenants association had no state constitutional right to
distribute unsolicited newsletter); see also supra Part I.A.1.
156. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tension
between those who would strengthen free speech by expanding its protections evenly to
private property and those who would strengthen free speech by emphasizing that there is
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In the long run, however, this heightened protection may not be
worth much. The current approach not only leads to poor analysis
but also creates harmful incentives that may ultimately undermine the
public forum doctrine. A serious problem arises because the
boundary between public and private property is fully within the
government's control and is generally shifting toward privatization.'57
The sharp contrast between constitutional treatment of public
property and private property creates an incentive for states and cities
(and private parties who engage in land transactions with them) to
privatize areas such as sidewalks, plazas, and shopping centers as a
way of avoiding more stringent First Amendment scrutiny. For
example, Salt Lake City, Utah, recently vacated a public pedestrian
easement in a downtown plaza after the Tenth Circuit held that the
presence of the government-owned easement required that the plaza
be treated as a public forum.'58 Other cities have taken similar steps
towards privatization to avoid the public forum doctrine.'59 When the
law encourages governments to privatize in this manner, it does not
further the freedom of speech and often leads to the loss of other
public advantages associated with government ownership. 6°
Perhaps even more significantly, the dichotomy between public
and private property skews private market decisions and the
character of new developments. If people prefer to shop, work, or
obtain medical services in places where they are not confronted by
something constitutionally special about government property.
157. See generally Franzese, supra note 12 (describing the trend toward governmental
privatization).
158. See May, supra note 2. The LDS Church, which purchased and developed the
plaza property, compensated the city for the easement. Id. As a result of the court's
decision, however, the city and church lost the advantages of their original bargain, which
was to have a plaza subject to a public easement while at the same time allowing the
church the benefit of controlling the speech environment. Id. Because the advantages of
private control were paramount, leading to a second transaction, the court's ruling
ultimately failed to further the freedom of speech on the plaza. Rather, the ruling only
caused the elimination of a valuable public right of way. Id.
159. For example, Ann Arbor, Michigan, tried to vacate a public sidewalk easement
near an abortion clinic so the clinic could bar anti-abortion demonstrators, although a
court ultimately found the action unconstitutional. See Thomason v. Jernigan, 770 F.
Supp. 1195, 1203 (E.D. Mich. 1991). Similarly, Richmond, Virginia "privatized" the
sidewalks around a public housing complex by transferring title to a housing authority,
which in turn placed signs on the sidewalk stating that the property is private and that
unauthorized persons are not allowed. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 115-18 (2003).
160. For Salt Lake City pedestrians, this meant the loss of a right-of-way that they once
enjoyed over Main Street Plaza, something that was originally part of the bargain between
the City and the LDS Church, that was presumably important to some residents. See May,
supra note 2. For others, this might mean the loss of public regulatory control and access
relating to sidewalks, parks, shopping areas, and transportation centers.
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political or religious demonstrators, their private consumer decisions
will reflect this. This encourages the development of private
shopping centers, office parks, and medical clinics that are
surrounded by private sidewalks and parking lots, whereon public
speech is generally forbidden. Because current law does not allow
cities to impose similar restraints on city sidewalks, this may
contribute to the public abandonment of downtown city areas that
once served as primary First Amendment forums.
In the end, the dichotomy is likely to harm the freedom of
speech. A robust public forum doctrine that protects the public's
right to demonstrate on government-owned sidewalks is of little value
if one lives in a city that does not own any sidewalks except ones that
are usually empty. In an increasing number of communities,
particularly suburbs, the real public gathering places are now
privately owned. Ironically, the strictness of our public forum
doctrine as applied to government property, coupled with the virtual
absence of First Amendment scrutiny for private property,
encourages this type of development.
Finally, the emphasis that current law places on whether
property is government-owned or privately owned leads to
arbitrariness and inequality. It creates radically different speech
environments in different communities, based solely on the way
property is allocated. This hurts potential speakers in heavily
privatized environments; it also hurts those who are affected by
harassing speakers in other environments. In one community, say a
typical suburb, a woman may drive to an abortion clinic parking lot,
enter the clinic, and leave the same way, without even noticing any
anti-abortion protesters because there are no public sidewalks near
enough to be useful for protesters."' In another community, say a
traditional urban environment, a woman may have no option but to
enter a clinic directly from a public sidewalk where she is likely to be
confronted at close range by hurtful and potentially harassing
speech. 62 The difference in the two women's experiences is stark,
and it is solely a function of the false distinction between government
161. See State v. Scholberg, 412 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (ruling that
anti-abortion protesters have no right to demonstrate on a private sidewalk surrounding
an abortion clinic, even where there is no other way to communicate to the intended
audience).
162. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377-80 (1996)
(holding an injunction requiring abortion protestors on public property to remain fifteen
feet from patients entering or leaving a clinic unconstitutional, even where law
enforcement officers found it difficult to prevent illegal harassment, such as grabbing,
yelling, and spitting).
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property and private property speech rights.
No matter where one thinks the ideal balance lies between
speech and privacy in a free society, the traditional state action
approach-with its categorical emphasis on property allocation-does
a poor job of achieving such balance consistently across time and
across varying communities.
C. Public Speech Under a Formal State Action Approach
A formal approach to state action begins by recognizing that
property law is a form of state action. If the police arrest and remove
a person from private land for attempting to demonstrate against the
owner's wishes, the government is, in fact, acting in a way that
restrains speech.
At the same time, a formal approach would not impute a private
owner's motives or policies directly to the government. If a speaker is
expelled because the private owner of that place does not appreciate
the person's speech, one should not analyze the case as if the
government's purpose is to suppress speech, even if that is the private
owner's purpose. Rather, the relevant government action consists of
enforcing a general system of land allocation, whereby private owners
are allowed to exclude others from defined locations based on their
own private preferences. 163  The question for the merits becomes
whether this form of state action is consistent with the freedom of
speech.
Examining the component of state action closely, and
distinguishing it from the component of private action, we might view
private property law as a delegation of power." It is comparable to
many other government delegations that place private individuals and
entities in the position of controlling the speech of others. The
federal government allows certain private corporations to control the
use of domain names on the Internet, including the power to refuse
domain names that are offensive; 165 it allows a private entity to decide
who may use the word "Olympic" for promotional or commercial
163. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
164. For a comparable method of analyzing the constitutionality of regulatory and
legislative programs creating public-private partnerships, see Gillian E. Metzger,
Privatization as Delegation 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 passim (2003).
165. For several years, the government allowed Network Solutions, Inc. exclusive
control over private domain name registration. See Island Online, Inc. v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 289, 292-95 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing background of
government's cooperative agreement with Network Solutions, Inc. and rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to its policy against obscene domain names). The registration of
domain names is now managed by multiple private corporations. Id. at 294.
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purposes; 166 it allows cable television operators to ban indecent
programming on leased-access channels;167 and it allows copyright
owners to prohibit the duplication or public performance of certain
creative works.
168
In each of these contexts, the government has affirmatively
created a system that allows private parties to restrict the speech of
others. The resulting speech restrictions are often substantial, and are
enforceable by law. In most cases, the Constitution would not allow
the government to impose such speech restrictions directly. 69
Because the restrictions arise through a process of private
decisionmaking, however, the state's actions are likely constitutional.
Why might the presence of a private intermediary matter for
purposes of the First Amendment, if a legal system created by state
action still ultimately restricts speech? A reasonable answer might
have to do with government's purposes for its actions in relation to
the content of the speech that is excluded. Courts have long
recognized that government actions that single out speech on the
basis of content raise heightened First Amendment concerns; 70 such
censoring laws are subject to strict scrutiny.17' By contrast, where
government acts in a manner that is neutral with respect to the
content of speech, or in a way that is designed to facilitate speech in
166. 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (Supp. 2000); see also S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 541 (1987) (upholding the restriction on use of the word
"Olympic" against freedom of speech challenge).
167. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (1994); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737-53 (1996) (upholding private delegation to cable operators
concerning leased-access channels).
168. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
169. In Denver Area, for example, the Court held unconstitutional one provision of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act requiring operators to
segregate indecent programming that they chose not to prohibit. 518 U.S. at 753-60. The
Court found this provision to distinguishable from other delegation provisions because it
"does not simply permit, but rather requires, cable system operators to restrict speech."
Id. at 753.
170. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2787, 2788 (2004) ("Content-based
regulations ... have the constant potential to be a repressive force in the lives and
thoughts of a free people."); Police Dept. of Chi. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."). For a
discussion of the reasons supporting this distinction, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 194-97 (1983) (stating
that the Supreme Court applies a "more stringent standard to content-based than to
content-neutral restrictions").
171. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (declaring
that content-based regulations must be "narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
Government interest"); id. at 818 ("It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of
its content will ever be permissible.").
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
general, a lower level of scrutiny applies.172 For the most part, laws
that delegate to private parties the authority to control speech within
certain domains are content-neutral, at least insofar as the
government's role is concerned; in many cases, such laws even serve
important speech-promoting functions.
Within this framework, we can explain, without resorting to state
action fictions, why the general law of private property is consistent
with the freedom of speech. The government has many reasons that
are both compelling and content-neutral for recognizing and
enforcing private property rights. Private property is the most
effective way we know for society to allocate resources efficiently, to
provide incentives for production, and to provide for the private use
and enjoyment of things and places. The law of private property even
serves the same liberal values that the freedom of speech serves. 173 It
is a vehicle for individual autonomy and self-expression. For many
people, the freedom to exercise private dominion over certain things
and places, much like the freedom of private thought and
imagination, is an aspect of personal identity.
174
Indeed, the general law of property-including the right of
private owners to exclude others on the basis of viewpoint-is not
only neutral with respect to speech content, it is an integral part of the
freedom of speech. For freedom of speech to flourish, the
government must allow private individuals a way to use certain
resources such as printing presses, assembly halls, broadcast facilities,
172. See, e.g., Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323-24 (2002) (stating that a
time, place, or manner regulation does not require the same procedural safeguards as
subject matter censorship). Similarly, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781
(1989), the Court explained that:
Our cases make clear ... that even in a public forum the government may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place or manner of protected speech, provided
the restrictions "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information."
Id. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
173. We might even say, as James Madison did, that the freedom of speech is a species
of property right grounded in natural law. James Madison, Property, in 14 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 266, 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). According to this
view, property cannot be in conflict with the freedom of speech, because one of its
components is the freedom of speech. Id.; see also John 0. McGinnis, The Once and
Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, passim
(1996) (expounding on the Madisonian view that the freedom of speech is a property right
and its implications for modern law).
174. For a powerful development of the personhood theory of property, see generally
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
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and sidewalks for the communication of their ideas. The government
must even allow those speakers to sometimes use those resources
exclusively. 7 5 Otherwise, the noise and clutter of too many messages
in one place would weaken everyone's ability to communicate. The
law of private property enables the orderly and exclusive use of
valuable communicative resources, and accordingly serves a crucial
First Amendment function. As Jed Rubenfeld has written, "Turning
all private property-homes, private schools, newspapers, movie
theatres-into viewpoint-neutral free speech zones would be the
realization ... not of a First Amendment dream, but of a First
Amendment nightmare.'
176
This explains why, under a formal state action approach, the
general law of private property is consistent with the First
Amendment, even though it is a form of state action that substantially
restricts speech. One need not resort to state action fictions to save
private property from the First Amendment. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine how the freedom of speech could meaningfully exist without
the state's willingness to enforce actively rules of private property.
At the same time, reconciling private property and the First
Amendment in this manner has important implications for the way
we analyze both public and private property speech restrictions. Note
that it is not the formal label of private property that justifies most
private-property speech restrictions under the First Amendment.
Nor is it a general conclusion that one person's property "rights"
must outweigh another person's freedom of speech. 177 Instead, the
validity of private property law has to do with its structure-allowing
private decisionmakers, rather than the government, to control
speech in certain contexts-and the reasons for which the
government recognizes such private rights, which in most cases are
legitimate and content-neutral.
This explanation for property means two things. First, if the
government acts with respect to private property in a way that is not
175. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-55 (1974)
(holding that the state may not force newspapers to print replies to articles it publishes by
private individuals whose character is questioned).
176. Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112
YALE L.J. 1, 28 (2002).
177. This is how the New Jersey Supreme Court treated the question in Schmid,
balancing one owner's supposed property rights against the free speech interests of others.
See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 629-30 (N.J. 1980). By contrast, under the formal state
action approach, the proper balancing question would compare the government's interests
as a regulator and enforcer of private property against the speaker's interest in free
expression.
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content-neutral or that does not satisfy whatever lower level of
scrutiny applies to content-neutral speech regulations, then the action
might still be unconstitutional. Private property is not categorically
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. Second, if there is nothing
special about the status of private property that justifies exempting it,
then there is also nothing special about government property that
justifies heightened First Amendment scrutiny. It is entirely possible,
given the reasons why private property exclusions are usually valid,
that many regulations affecting speech on government property ought
also to be considered valid. When government restricts speech on
public property in ways that are content-neutral (either through
direct regulation or by delegating to private decisionmakers the
authority to restrict speech)" 8 the same kind of deference that
justifies private property is appropriate.
A formal approach to state action therefore suggests that
content-neutral private property laws and content-neutral regulations
of government property should receive the same scrutiny when they
ultimately restrict speech, whatever form of scrutiny that turns out to
be. As far as the government's actions are concerned, private
property laws are another form of content-neutral regulation
restricting the time, place, and manner of speech.
D. Reexamining Time, Place, and Manner Scrutiny
To identify property law as a form of content-neutral speech
regulation produces practical and analytical advantages for the
freedom of speech. Uniform treatment of public-property and
private-property speech restrictions would eliminate artificial
incentives for governments and land developers to privatize land." 9
It would also reduce the contrast between speech rights in urban and
suburban environments that arise because of varying distributions of
property.Y° It would thus enable more consistent protection of the
freedom of speech across time and across a wider variety of
communities.
178. Such delegations might take the form of licenses, as in United Auto Workers,
Local No. 5285 v. Gaston Festivals, Inc., 43 F.3d 902, 904-11 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding
authority of private festival organizer to control who may use public streets and sidewalks
for festival purposes), or they might take the form of a permanent private property right
that coexists with government property interests, as in First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake
City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 2002) (examining a public
easement subject to the underlying owner's authority to control speech).
179. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
180. See id.
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What is more, the formal approach to state action would provide
a clearer and more complete framework in which to question the
appropriate scrutiny for content-neutral speech regulations. The
approach should force one to ask fundamentally, without regard to
property labels, what is it that the freedom of speech minimally
guarantees in a society where geographic restrictions on speech
(including those imposed by property law) are pervasive and are
usually well-justified? This is not an easy question to answer. It
encompasses many smaller questions and considerations, about which
reasonable people may differ. By framing the inquiry in this manner,
however, it is more likely at least that courts and legal analysts will
see the full problem with which they are dealing. It is more likely that
the discussion of content-neutral standards will consistently track the
values of the First Amendment, while recognizing other values that
often justify speech limitations.
This approach might lead to the conclusion that the appropriate
First Amendment standard for content-neutral regulations (including
property laws) lies somewhere between the heightened scrutiny that
currently applies to traditional public forums and the absence of
scrutiny that applies to privately owned locations. There are few who
would wish to interpret the First Amendment in a way that would
significantly undermine the advantages of private property. At the
same time, some forms of public expression, including oral speech,
leafleting, picketing, and sign-waiving, are valuable enough that we
should be reluctant to conclude that such rights can be made purely
contingent on the preferences of other people. Even laws that are
content-neutral must leave adequate space for some essential forms
of communication.
18t
A reasonable way to resolve the tension between public speech
values and the values served by private property would be to
conclude that the First Amendment requires governments to provide
minimally adequate opportunities for public communication. What is
an adequate means of communication would likely vary according to
the speaker's intended audience. When a speaker wishes to
communicate with the general public about an issue of social
181. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) (finding that ordinance
restricting signs did not leave open ample alternative means for communication, and was
therefore unconstitutional); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50, 53-
54 (1986) (ruling that zoning of sexually oriented businesses must leave "reasonable
alternative avenues of communication"); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding that regulations affecting the time, place, and manner of
speech must "leave open ample alternative channels for communication").
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importance, one might conclude that the First Amendment
guarantees the speaker the right to engage the general public in
person. In other words, every community must have meaningful
public forums where views of all types are permitted, where leafleting
is allowed, where loud speech is allowed, and where large numbers of
people actually go. If a city's public sidewalks and parks do not meet
these criteria, a government may be required to open some privately
owned areas for these purposes, such as sidewalks around shopping
malls and grocery stores.
As a speaker's intended audience becomes more specific,
however, what is an adequate means of communication would likely
change; he or she might have to be satisfied with more limited or
remote means. Speakers who would target the patients of a specific
abortion clinic, or the members of a specific church, for example,
might have to be satisfied with picketing from a distance, rather than
engaging the audience up close.182 When a speaker wishes to send an
unsolicited message to a specific person, without an invitation, even
the opportunity to mail a letter should even satisfy that speaker's
First Amendment rights.
Adequacy of communicative means is the most persuasive
normative principle explaining why the government is limited in its
ability to restrict speech through rules that are content-neutral.183 The
most troubling thing, for example, about a regulation that would
prohibit all leafleting, soliciting, or advocacy to strangers in all parts
of a city is that it would foreclose an invaluable method of
communication for many people.184 A society that does not allow
face-to-face advocacy of ideas to the general public, at least in some
places, does not allow adequate means of communication, and
therefore violates the freedom of speech. The same principle should
apply whether it is private property or a government regulation that
stands in a speaker's way of communicating."8
182. Cf. Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992) (stating that under the National
Labor Relations Act, union organizer's right to communicate with employees is satisfied if
unions are able to picket near the entrance of workplace parking lot).
183. See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 147, at 57-59.
184. Cf. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Door to door
distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.").
185. This is the standard that already apply is some parts of First Amendment law, see
City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 56; Clark, 468 U.S. at 293, and is the standard the federal labor
law imposes on employers who wish to exclude union organizers from speaking on their
private property. See Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 531-41 (finding that it is an unfair labor
practice under the NLRA for employers to deny union organizers access to private
property for purposes of communicating with employees where union has no other
reasonable means of communicating with the employees).
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The principle that government must allow adequate means of
communication explains Marsh v. Alabama's holding that one has a
right to engage the public in a company-owned town.186 The fact that
the town's owner was performing a public function does not
persuasively explain the case or distinguish it from other private-
property situations.87 However, the outcome in Marsh does make
sense on the grounds that where the government allows an owner to
hold a very large share of property, which the owner then uses to
create an isolated community that would otherwise have no
reasonable access to public speech, the First Amendment prevents
the government's enforcement of the owner's speech-repressive
property rules. 8 While it would be permissible to ban speech in
some locations in the town, the First Amendment should prohibit the
application of laws that fail to allow reasonable locations for
traditional public expression. To hold otherwise would suggest that
government could privatize all aspects of society and all modes of
communication, placing society's speech at the whim of private
decisionmakers.
If adequacy of communicative means is the appropriate measure
of the freedom of speech in privatized environments, the First
Amendment should require no more or less in communities where
the government owns most or all of the land. As the Supreme Court
has sometimes said, "[t]he State, no less than a private owner of
property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the
use to which it is lawfully dedicated." ' 9  This suggests that
governments should have greater flexibility to restrict speech on
186. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
187. See discussion supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
188. Some language in the Supreme Court's Marsh opinion supports this
interpretation, see 326 U.S. at 507-09, as opposed to the public function theory of the case
that more recent state action decisions have imposed upon it. See supra note 66.
189. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966). The logic of using private property
rights by analogy to justify public property regulations originates with Justice Holmes's
opinion in Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), aff'd sub nom. Davis v.
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), in which he wrote: "for the Legislature absolutely or
conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an
infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house
to forbid it in his house." Id. at 113. While Justice Holmes's opinion equating public and
private property has been criticized based on the supposition that it would allow the
government plenary control to eliminate speech on public property, see, e.g., Calvin
Massey, Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
309, 313-14 (1999), this conclusion only follows if one assumes that private property rights
are unlimited by the First Amendment. Under the analysis proposed here, both private
property and public property speech restrictions would be limited by a singular principle
that government must allow adequate forums for public communication.
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public property (even traditional sidewalks or parks) than current law
allows, as long as they do so in ways that are content-neutral and that
leave adequate forums for public communication. Certain site-
specific factors such as current use, ownership, historical expectations,
or compatibility with speech (which sometimes enter into current
law), may be relevant as to which places should be open for speech.
But there is no apparent reason why the First Amendment should
take decisions affecting the location of public forums away from state
and local governments who regulate property and land use, as long as
those governments leave adequate forums for public speech. Only
when a government fails through its laws to allow a speaker an
adequate means of communication should a federal court apply site-
specific policy criteria-such as compatibility of the location for
public speech, history, or ownership-to determine which places at a
minimum must be open for expression. 90
Recognizing private property as a content-neutral restriction on
speech, which in most applications is constitutional unless it goes so
far as to deprive speakers of adequate means of communication, may
not be the only plausible way to rationalize private property and free
speech law. It is, however, one workable way to do so, and suffices to
show that state action fictions are not necessary to achieve a fair
balance between privacy and speech interests. The conventional all-
or-nothing state action framework tends only to obscure the difficult
interpretive decisions that, one way or another, courts must resolve.
By applying the state action doctrine literally, courts are more likely
to develop standards for protecting speech that are logically
consistent and that work across a wider range of circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The state action doctrine is essential to constitutional law. Its
primary value, however, is not as a preliminary requirement that
constitutional plaintiffs must satisfy before their claims will be heard
on the merits. All injuries are causally linked in some way to state
action. Most injuries are also caused to some degree by private
action. The function of the state action doctrine ought to be to isolate
the elements of state action in a case from the elements of private
action and focus the constitutional questions on the former. In other
words, the state action doctrine serves an analytical function. It only
190. This suggests that courts should reconsider the holding of Schneider v. Town of
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1939), which states that, insofar as public streets and
sidewalks are concerned, the adequacy of other alternative public forums is irrelevant.
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serves this function well, however, when courts identify the
component of state action with precision.
As shown by the public forum example, a formal approach to
state action need not produce extreme results. It does, however,
significantly affect how one thinks about constitutional rights. It
provides a more complete picture of the constitutional questions and
interests that courts must resolve, thereby recasting the interpretation
of specific constitutional doctrines in a positive way. If a formal state
action doctrine works well for Establishment Clause cases, and if it
would improve the analysis of public forum speech issues, then we
should expect that it would work well for other areas of constitutional
law. In the end, a formal and precise application of the state action
doctrine is useful not only for purposes of determining the scope of
constitutional law, but also for determining its substance.
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